The New York Times asks, "Are We In Danger of a Beer Monopoly?" (Thanks to MC for the link.) The subject of the article is the proposed purchase by InBev, the parent of Budweiser, of Grupo Modelo, the parent of Corona, Negro Modelo, and others. Those willing to pollute themselves with fizzy yellow adjunct beer would perhaps fear the prospect of higher prices from such a merger. But beer-as-big-business is obscuring the big picture: beer as small businesses.
Davidson writes, "InBev is already facing staunch competition from Denmark’s Carlsberg, Britain’s SABMiller and Japan’s Asahi. It’s not exactly worried about Sam Adams and Sierra Nevada." But the public has been fleeing watery American lagers for a generation, and not for the "super dry" Asahi. The winners are the thousands of craft breweries that have exploded unto the scene during the same period. They brew good beer, and they are legion.
The low end will always consolidate: if you can't charge for quality, you've got to make money on volume. But merger or no merger, it's never been a better time to be a beer drinker.
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Tuesday, February 26, 2013
Sunday, February 10, 2013
Arming Our Schools?
The NRA opposes bans on military-style weapons and on large magazines. They oppose universal background checks. Instead, they argue that the best way to protect children from rampage killings is to post armed guards at all of the nation's schools. Let's break down how that would work.
It's important to first understand the scope of the problem. There are approximately 10,000 people murdered in the United States with a firearm every year -- about twice the total of all other means combined. Since we're talking about armed invasion here, we won't consider suicide, accidental deaths, or killings in self defense.
About 500 of these murders are of people under 18 years of age, most of them teenagers. According to the US Secret Service, there are between one and five incidences of targeted gun violence at schools specifically each year. Other records agree. Most of these incidents result in one or two deaths, although every few years there tends to be a larger event: five, ten, or more victims. For the sake of this article, I will assume an average total of ten victims annually.
There are approximately 130,000 public and private schools in the United States, not including colleges and universities. If each were to hire one guard, that would constitute:
Supposing that we believe that a 13,000-to-one guard-to-victim ratio is reasonable, and that arming our schools is the best way we can think of to spend $6.5 billion protecting our children, we must next consider how effective these guards would likely be. For instance, most schools have more than a single entrance and do not have bars on their windows; in the event of an attack, a lone guard would likely have to make his way to the scene from another part of the building or grounds. The historical record on this is not promising. An investigation by Mother Jones magazine examined over 60 mass shootings, finding not a single case in which an armed civilian was successful in stopping the attack. And in 1999, two armed officers were present for the Columbine school shooting; neither was able to stop the shooters, or even slow them down.
There are two ways to address any risk: we can reduce the likelihood that it will occur, or we can mitigate the impact once it has occurred. Which strategy makes sense depends on how likely the risk is, how serious it is if it does occur, and how expensive mitigation is. In parts of the world where I've lived, getting bitten my a mosquito is common and non-serious, and treatment is cheap. I don't worry about avoiding mosquitos; I just keep the Benadryl in the medicine cabinet just in case. School shootings are not like that. They are extremely serious but relatively rare, and armed guards are extraordinarily expensive. We don't address risks like that by waiting for them to happen all the time. We address them by making them more rare. We protect ourselves from lightning strikes by staying away from lightning, not by attaching metal rods and drag chains to our everyday clothing. Any response to gun violence must fit the same model to make any sense. That means fewer guns, in more capable hands.
It's important to first understand the scope of the problem. There are approximately 10,000 people murdered in the United States with a firearm every year -- about twice the total of all other means combined. Since we're talking about armed invasion here, we won't consider suicide, accidental deaths, or killings in self defense.
About 500 of these murders are of people under 18 years of age, most of them teenagers. According to the US Secret Service, there are between one and five incidences of targeted gun violence at schools specifically each year. Other records agree. Most of these incidents result in one or two deaths, although every few years there tends to be a larger event: five, ten, or more victims. For the sake of this article, I will assume an average total of ten victims annually.
There are approximately 130,000 public and private schools in the United States, not including colleges and universities. If each were to hire one guard, that would constitute:
- 13 guards per firearm homicide in the United States
- 260 guards per child murdered with a gun
- 13,000 guards per child murdered with a gun at a school
Supposing that we believe that a 13,000-to-one guard-to-victim ratio is reasonable, and that arming our schools is the best way we can think of to spend $6.5 billion protecting our children, we must next consider how effective these guards would likely be. For instance, most schools have more than a single entrance and do not have bars on their windows; in the event of an attack, a lone guard would likely have to make his way to the scene from another part of the building or grounds. The historical record on this is not promising. An investigation by Mother Jones magazine examined over 60 mass shootings, finding not a single case in which an armed civilian was successful in stopping the attack. And in 1999, two armed officers were present for the Columbine school shooting; neither was able to stop the shooters, or even slow them down.
There are two ways to address any risk: we can reduce the likelihood that it will occur, or we can mitigate the impact once it has occurred. Which strategy makes sense depends on how likely the risk is, how serious it is if it does occur, and how expensive mitigation is. In parts of the world where I've lived, getting bitten my a mosquito is common and non-serious, and treatment is cheap. I don't worry about avoiding mosquitos; I just keep the Benadryl in the medicine cabinet just in case. School shootings are not like that. They are extremely serious but relatively rare, and armed guards are extraordinarily expensive. We don't address risks like that by waiting for them to happen all the time. We address them by making them more rare. We protect ourselves from lightning strikes by staying away from lightning, not by attaching metal rods and drag chains to our everyday clothing. Any response to gun violence must fit the same model to make any sense. That means fewer guns, in more capable hands.
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